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Abstract. In previous work, we have investigated privacy-preserving
publishing of Description Logic (DL) ontologies in a setting where the
knowledge about individuals to be published is an EL instance store, and
both the privacy policy and the possible background knowledge of an
attacker are represented by concepts of the DL EL. We have introduced
the notions of compliance of a concept with a policy and of safety of
a concept for a policy, and have shown how, in the context mentioned
above, optimal compliant (safe) generalizations of a given EL concept
can be computed. In the present paper, we consider a modified setting
where we assume that the background knowledge of the attacker is given
by a DL different from the one in which the knowledge to be published
and the safety policies are formulated. In particular, we investigate the
situations where the attacker’s knowledge is given by an FL0 or an FLE
concept. In both cases, we show how optimal safe generalizations can
be computed. Whereas the complexity of this computation is the same
(ExpTime) as in our previous results for the case of FL0, it turns out to
be actually lower (polynomial) for the more expressive DL FLE .
1 Introduction
Description Logics (DLs) [3] are a well-investigated family of logic-based knowl-
edge representation languages, which are frequently used to formalize ontolo-
gies for application domains such as biology and medicine [13]. To define the
important notions of such an application domain as formal concepts, DLs state
necessary and sufficient conditions for an individual to belong to a concept. For
example, in the DL EL [2], which is, e.g., employed to define the large medical
ontology SNOMED CT,1 the concept of all male patients that are seen by a
female doctor working in the oncology department can be formalized as
C = Patient Male ∃seen_by .(Doctor Female ∃works_in.Oncology). (1)
When publishing information about an individual (e.g., by stating that it
belongs to a concept like C in (1)), one needs to ensure that certain privacy
F. Baader—Partially funded by DFG grant 389792660 as part of TRR 248.
A. Nuradiansyah—Funded by DFG within the Research Training Group 1907 RoSI.
1 see https://www.snomed.org.
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constraints are fulfilled. These constraints are encoded as privacy policies, and
before publishing the information one needs to check whether the information
is compliant with these policies [5,11,12]. For example, when publishing infor-
mation about hospitals, doctors, and patients, the policy may require that one
should not be able to find out who are the cancer patients. This policy can, for
instance, be expressed by the EL concept
D = Patient  ∃seen_by .(Doctor  ∃works_in.Oncology). (2)
The concept C in (1) is not compliant with this policy D since C is subsumed
by D (written C  D), i.e., if we know that an individual belongs to C, then we
can conclude that is also belongs to D. Thus, part of the information contained
in C needs to be removed before it can be published. In [5], we have shown
how to compute optimal compliant generalizations of C, i.e., concepts C ′ such
that C  C ′ and C ′  D, where optimal means that C ′ should be as close
to C as possible. In our example, the concept C ′ = Male  ∃seen_by .(Doctor 
Female∃works_in.Oncology) is such an optimal compliant generalization of C.
However, it is not safe. In fact, if we publish that John belongs to this concept,
and the attacker already knows that John is a patient, then the attacker can
still deduce that John belongs to the concept D in (2) since Patient  C ′  D.
In general, we say that C ′ is not safe for the policy D if there is a compliant
concept E such that C ′ E  D. Using the algorithm of [5] we can compute the
(unique) optimal safe generalization C ′′ of C in (1) w.r.t. the policy D in (2):
C ′′ = Male  ∃seen_by .(Doctor  Female  ∃works_in.) 
∃seen_by .(Female  ∃works_in.Oncology).
In [5] it was assumed that the information to be published about individuals,
the policies, and the attacker’s background knowledge are all given by concepts of
the DL EL. In the present paper, we investigate how the notion of safety changes
if the attacker’s knowledge is assumed to be given by concepts formulated in
a different DL. More precisely, we consider the DL FL0, which differs from
EL in that value restrictions ∀r.C are used instead of existential restrictions
∃r.C, and the DL FLE , which combines the constructors of EL and FL0. If
we assume in our example that the attacker’s knowledge is given by an FL0
concept, the concept C ′′ from above is no longer safe. In fact, we have C ′′ 
Patient  ∀seen_by .∀works_in.Oncology  D. An attacker may, for example,
gain this knowledge by learning that the individual in question is a patient, but
is not seen by any of the doctors working in another department. The results
shown in the present paper imply that the concept
C ′′′ = Male  Patient  ∃seen_by .(Doctor  Female)
is an optimal safe generalization of C in (1) w.r.t. the policy D in (2) if the
attacker’s knowledge is assumed to be given by an FL0 concept.
If, instead, we assume that the attacker’s knowledge is given by an FLE
concept, then C ′′′ is no longer safe. In fact, C ′′′ ∀seen_by .∃works_in.Oncology
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 D. In this setting, the results shown in this paper imply that C ′′′′ = Male is
the optimal safe generalization of C in (1) w.r.t. the policy D in (2). It may be
less intuitive to see how an attacker could gain this additional knowledge. But
the assumption in [5,11,12] and in the present paper is that the attacker can gain
any compliant knowledge that can be formulated in the considered formalism
(i.e., FLE concepts in the last part of our example).
To be more precise, just as in [5], we assume here that all knowledge about
individuals (be it the one to be published or the one known by an attacker)
is represented using concepts, which corresponds to what is called an instance
store in [14]. The restriction compared to general DL-based ontologies is, on the
hand, that relations between named individuals cannot be stated. On the other
hand, there is no TBox available to state subconcept constraints. One reason
for considering this restricted setting is that, when investigating a new inference
problem, it is usually quite hard to start with the most general situation. Also
note that the work in [11,12] concentrates on a setting where there are rela-
tions between individuals, but no instance relationships between individuals and
complex concepts can be stated. Our hope is that, by combining our approaches
with the ones developed in [11,12], we can make the step from instance stores to
general DL ABoxes. A second reason is that, in a medical application that uses
SNOMED CT as an ontology, the TBox can be reduced away by expanding con-
cept definitions since SNOMED CT is an acyclic TBox [16]. In addition, patient
data are usually annotated with SNOMED concepts, but not with SNOMED
roles, which justifies considering an instance store rather than a general ABox.
The main difference to our work in [5] is that we assume that the background
knowledge of the attacker is formulated in a DL (FL0 or FLE) different from
the one (EL) in which the knowledge to be published and the safety policies are
expressed. Using FL0 concepts for formulating the attacker’s knowledge makes
sense since in SNOMED CT roles have implicit typing constraints [16], which
are not explicitly stated using value restrictions, but which may be known to an
attacker. Considering FLE as well is interesting from an academic perspective
since our results illustrate the effect that assuming a more expressive DL for the
attacker’s knowledge may have on the computation of safe generalizations.
In the next section, we will introduce the DLs FLE , EL, and FL0, and then
define the notions of compliance and safety used in this paper. In Sect. 3, we will
investigate the setting where the attacker’s knowledge is assumed to be given by
an FL0 concept, and in Sect. 4 we consider the case where FLE is used instead.
2 Preliminaries
A wide range of DLs of different expressive power has been investigated in the
literature [3]. Here, we introduce the DL FLE and its sublogics EL and FL0.
Starting with disjoint sets NC and NR of concept and role names, respec-
tively, the set of FLE concepts over these names are constructed from concept
names using the constructors top concept (), conjunction (C  D), existential
restriction (∃r.C), and value restriction (∀r.D). The sublogic EL forbids the use
Final edited form was published in "KI: Joint German/Austrian Conference on Artificial Intelligence (Künstliche Intelligenz). 
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of value restrictions, and FL0 forbids the use of existential restrictions. The size
of an FLE concept C is the number of occurrences of  as well as concept and
role names in C, and the role depth rd(C) is the maximal nesting of existential
restrictions and value restrictions.
The semantics of FLE (and thus of EL and FL0) is defined through inter-
pretations I = (ΔI , ·I), where ΔI is a non-empty set, called the domain, and ·I
is the interpretation function, which maps every A ∈ NC to a set AI ⊆ ΔI and
every r ∈ NR to a binary relation rI ⊆ ΔI × ΔI . This function is extended to
arbitrary FLE concepts by setting
– I := ΔI and (C  D)I := CI ∩ DI ,
– (∃r.C)I := {δ ∈ ΔI | ∃η ∈ ΔI .(δ, η) ∈ rI ∧ η ∈ CI}, and
– (∀r.C)I := {δ ∈ ΔI | ∀η ∈ ΔI .(δ, η) ∈ rI ⇒ η ∈ CI}.
The FLE concept C is subsumed by the FLE concept D (written C  D) if
CI ⊆ DI holds for all interpretations I. Strict subsumption (written C  D)
holds if C  D and D  C, and we say that C is equivalent to D (written
C ≡ D) if C  D and D  C.
Whereas subsumption between concepts (without a TBox) is polynomial in
EL [6] and FL0 [15], it is NP-complete for FLE [7]. Fortunately, in the context
of this paper, we are not interested in subsumption between two FLE concepts,
but only in deciding whether an FLE concept is subsumed by an EL concept.
Before we can show that this problem is decidable in polynomial time, we need
to introduce some notation.
We call an FLE concept an atom if it is a concept name, an existential
restriction, or a value restriction, and we denote the set of atoms occurring in
the top-level conjunction of an FLE concept C with con(C). For example, if
C = A  ∃r.(B  ∃s.A)  ∀r.∀s.B, then con(C) = {A,∃r.(B  ∃s.A),∀r.∀s.B}.
Given an FLE concept C and a role name r ∈ NR, we define filler∀r (C) :=
{E | ∀r.E ∈ con(C)}.
The following proposition is an easy consequence of the characterization of
subsumption between FLE concepts given in [6] (Theorem 24).
Proposition 1. Let C be an FLE concept and D be an EL concept. Then,
C  D holds iff
(a.) A ∈ con(D) implies A ∈ con(C) for every concept name A, and
(b.) for every ∃r.D′ ∈ con(D), there is ∃r.C′ ∈ con(C) such that
C ′ 

filler∀r (C)  D′,
where

filler∀r (C) denotes the conjunction of all elements of filler
∀
r (C).
In particular, subsumption between C and D can be decided in time polynomial
in the size of C and D.
By induction on the role depth, it is easy to show that the recursive characteriza-
tion of subsumption between an FLE and an EL concept given in the proposition
indeed yields a polynomial-time decision procedure.
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We close this section by defining the notions of compliance and safety used
in this paper. Following [5], we assume that policies are given not just by one
EL concept, but by a finite set of EL concepts. We assume that these concepts
are not equivalent to  since otherwise there would not be compliant concepts.
Definition 1. An EL policy is a finite set P = {D1, . . . , Dp} of EL concepts
that are not equivalent to . Let C be an EL concept, Q ∈ {∃,∀,∀∃}, and
L∃ = EL,L∀ = FL0,L∀∃ = FLE. We say that
– the LQ concept C ′ is compliant with P if C ′  Di for all i = 1, . . . , p,
– the EL concept C ′ is
• Q-safe for P if for all LQ concepts C ′′ that are compliant with P, C ′ C ′′
is also compliant with P, i.e., C ′  C ′′  Di for all i = 1, . . . , p,
• a Q-safe generalization of C for P if C  C ′ and C ′ is Q-safe for P,
• an optimal Q-safe generalization of C for P if it is a Q-safe generalization
of C for P, and there is no Q-safe generalization C ′′ of C for P such that
C ′′  C ′.
Let C,C ′ be EL concepts, P be an EL policy, and Q ∈ {∃,∀,∀∃}. The Q-
safety problem asks whether C is Q-safe for P and the Q-ptimality problem asks
whether C ′ is an optimal Q-safe generalization of C for P.
We call an EL policy P redundancy-free if P does not contain distinct concepts
D,D′ such that D  D′. We can without loss of generality restrict our attention
to redundancy-free policies since removing redundant concepts (i.e., concepts
D′ ∈ P such that there is D ∈ P \ {D′} with D  D′) does not change the sets
of compliant and safe concepts (see Lemma 2 in [5]).
Compliance for EL concepts and ∃-safety have been investigated in detail in
[5]. In the following two sections, we investigate ∀-safety and ∀∃-safety.
3 Investigating ∀-Safety
In this section, we first characterize ∀-safety and prove that this characterization
can be decided in polynomial time. Then, we show how to compute optimal
∀-safe generalizations of a given EL concept. Finally, we address the ∀-optimality
problem.
Characterizing ∀-Safety. First, note that a value restriction can never imply
an existential restriction. Thus, if C ′′ is an FL0 concept and D an EL concept of
role depth > 0, then C ′′  D. This shows that an FL0 concept C ′′ is compliant
with any EL policy that does not contain a concept of role depth 0.
Using this observation and Proposition 1, we can characterize ∀-safety for
redundancy-free policies as follows.
Proposition 2. Let C be an EL concept and P a redundancy-free EL policy.
Then C is ∀-safe for P iff the following two conditions hold for all D ∈ P:
Final edited form was published in "KI: Joint German/Austrian Conference on Artificial Intelligence (Künstliche Intelligenz). 
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(1.) if rd(D) = 0, then con(C) ∩ con(D) = ∅,
(2.) if rd(D) > 0, then there is ∃r.D′ ∈ con(D) such that
(a.) if rd(D′) = 0, then there is no concept of the form ∃r.C ′ ∈ con(C),
(b.) if rd(D′) > 0, then for all ∃r.C ′ ∈ con(C), C ′ is ∀-safe for {D′}.
Proof. To show the if-direction, assume that C is not ∀-safe for P. Then, there
is an EL concept D ∈ P and an FL0 concept C ′′ that complies with P such
that C  C ′′  D. Since C  C ′′ is an FLE concept, Proposition 1 applies to
this subsumption. First, we consider the case where rd(D) = 0. Proposition 1
implies that every concept name A ∈ con(D) is contained in con(C)∪ con(C ′′).
However, since C ′′ complies with P, we have C ′′  D, and hence there must
be an A ∈ con(D) that is not contained in con(C ′′). Consequently this A must
belong to con(C), and thus property 1.) above is violated.
Now, consider the case where rd(D) > 0, i.e., there is an existential restriction
∃r.D′ ∈ con(D). By Proposition 1 and since C is an EL and C ′′ an FL0 concept,
C  C ′′  D implies that there is an existential restriction ∃r.C ′ ∈ con(C) such
that C ′   filler∀r (C ′′)  D′. If rd(D′) = 0, then this clearly violates (2a.). If
rd(D′) > 0, then (2b.) is violated since

filler∀r (C
′′) then cannot be subsumed
by D′, and thus C ′   filler∀r (C ′′)  D′ shows that C ′ is not ∀-safe for {D′}.
To show the only-if-direction, we assume that one of the conditions (1.) or (2.)
is violated, and prove that this implies that C is not ∀-safe for P.
First, assume that (1.) is violated, i.e., there is D ∈ P such that rd(D) = 0
and there is A ∈ con(C) ∩ con(D). Then, C′′ := (con(D) \ {A}) is an FL0
concept that complies with D, and satisfies C  C ′′  D. To conclude that C is
not ∀-safe for P, it remains to show that C ′′ also complies with all D̂ ∈ P \{D}.
However, if we assume that C ′′  D̂ for some D̂ ∈ P \ {D}, then the fact that
D  C ′′ implies D  D̂, which contradicts our assumption that P is redundancy-
free.
Second, assume that (2.) is violated. Then there is D ∈ P such that rd(D) >
0 and for all ∃r.D′ ∈ con(D) we have
– if rd(D′) = 0, then there is a concept of the form ∃r.C ′ ∈ con(C), and
– if rd(D′) > 0, then there is ∃r.C ′ ∈ con(C) such that the concept C ′ is not
∀-safe for {D′}.








(1) A ∈ con(D);
(2) r ∈ NR,∃r.D′ ∈ con(D), and rd(D′) = 0;
(3) r ∈ NR,∃r.D′ ∈ con(D), rd(D′) > 0, ∃r.C ′ ∈ con(C), and F is an FL0
concept complying with D′, but satisfying C ′  F  D′.
Note that C ′′ is an FL0 concept that is compliant with P. To see the latter,
assume that D̂ ∈ P. If rd(D̂) > 0, then C ′′  D̂ since an FL0 concept cannot
imply an existential restriction. If rd(D̂) = 0, then C ′′  D̂ would imply D  D̂,
which contradicts our assumption that P is redundancy-free.
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It remains to prove that C  C ′′  D, which we show using Proposition 1.
First note that, by the construction of C′′, each concept name A ∈ con(D)
satisfies A ∈ con(C ′′), and thus A ∈ con(CC ′′). Second, consider an existential
restriction ∃r.D′ ∈ con(D). If rd(D′) = 0, then there is ∃r.C ′ ∈ con(C), but
also ∀r.D′ ∈ con(C ′′). Thus we have C ′   filler∀r (C  C ′′)  C ′  D′  D′,
as required by Proposition 1. If rd(D′) > 0, then we have ∃r.C ′ ∈ con(C) for
an EL concept C ′ that is not ∀-safe for {D′}. In addition, ∀r.F ∈ con(C ′′),
where F is an FL0 concept such that C ′  F  D′. Consequently, we have
C ′   filler∀r (C  C ′′)  C ′  F  D′. 
Using induction on the role depth, it is easy to show that the characterization
of ∀-safety stated in the above proposition can be decided in polynomial time.
Theorem 1. The ∀-safety problem is in P.
Since (1.) and (2.) in Proposition 2 are formulated for each D ∈ P separately,
the following lemma is an immediate consequence of this proposition.
Lemma 1. Let C be an EL concept and P an EL policy. Then C is ∀-safe for
P iff C is ∀-safe for {D} for all D ∈ P.
In this lemma, we have dispensed with the restriction that P is redundancy-
free. This is admissible since we can first remove redundant elements from P
and then apply the proposition to the redundancy-free policy obtained this way.
Note that this fact will become important in the proof of Lemma 3, since there
we cannot assume that the policy Pi defined there is redundancy-free.
Computing Optimal ∀-Safe Generalizations. Before we can describe our
approach for computing optimal ∀-safe generalizations, we need to introduce
some notation. Given an EL concept D such that rd(D) > 0, the set con∃(D)
consists of the elements of con(D) that are existential restrictions.
Definition 2. Let D1, . . . , Dp be EL concepts of role depth greater than
zero. We say that H ⊆ con∃(D1) ∪ . . . ∪ con∃(Dp) is a hitting set of
con∃(D1), . . . , con∃(Dp) if H ∩ con(Di) = ∅ for every i = 1, . . . , p. This hit-
ting set is minimal if, for all H′ ⊂ H, H′ is not a hitting set.
We will show that the set defined below contains all optimal ∀-safe general-
izations of C for P.
Definition 3. Let C be an EL concept and P = {D1, . . . , Dn} a redundancy-
free EL policy. The set SSG(C,P) of all specific ∀-safe generalizations of C for
P consists of the concepts C ′ that are obtained from C as follows:
– If C is ∀-safe for P, then SSG(C,P) = {C}.
– Otherwise, perform the following steps:
• For all concept names A ∈ con(C) such that A ∈ con(D), where D ∈ P
and rd(D) = 0, remove A from con(C).
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• If Dj1 , . . . , Djp are all concepts in P such that rd(Djν ) > 0, then construct
a minimal hitting set H of con∃(Dj1), . . . , con∃(Djp) and do the following:
∗ For all ∃r.E ∈ con(C) such that there is a concept of the form ∃r.D′
in H with rd(D′) = 0, remove ∃r.E from con(C).
∗ For each ∃ri.Ci ∈ con(C) that was not removed in the previous step,
consider the set
Pi := {D′ | ∃ri.D′ ∈ H and rd(D′) > 0}.
If Pi = ∅, then replace ∃ri.Ci in con(C) with
 ∃ri.F , where F ∈
SSG(Ci,Pi). If Pi is empty, then leave ∃ri.Ci as it is.
First, we show that the elements of SSG(C,P) are indeed ∀-safe generalization.
Lemma 2. If C ′ ∈ SSG(C,P), then C ′ is a ∀-safe generalization of C for P.
Proof. First, we show that C  C ′. This is an easy consequence of the fact
that, when constructing C ′ from C, atoms from the top-level conjunction of C
are kept unchanged, removed, or generalized. The only non-trivial case is when
∃ri.Ci in con(C) is replaced with
 ∃ri.F , where F ranges over the elements
of SSG(Ci,Pi). By induction on the role depth, we know that Ci  F for all
F ∈ SSG(Ci,Pi), and thus ∃r.Ci  ∃r.F .
To prove that C ′ is safe for P, we use the characterization given in Propo-
sition 2. Thus, let D ∈ P. If rd(D) = 0, then con(D) is a set of concept
names, and each of them has been removed in the construction of C′. Thus,
con(C ′) ∩ con(D) = ∅, as required by (1.) in Proposition 2.
If rd(D) > 0, then the minimal hitting H used in the construction of C ′
contains an existential restriction ∃r.D̂ ∈ con(D). If rd(D̂) = 0, then all exis-
tential restrictions for the role r are removed from the top-level conjunction of
C, and thus 2a.) of Proposition 2 is satisfied. Finally, consider the case where
rd(D̂) > 0. If ∃r.E ∈ con(C ′), then there is ∃ri.Ci ∈ con(C) such that
Pi = {D′ | ∃ri.D′ ∈ H and rd(D′) > 0} = ∅,
and r = ri and E ∈ SSG(Ci,Pi). Note that D̂ ∈ Pi, and thus Pi = ∅ is not
possible for an existential restriction ∃ri.Ci ∈ con(C) with ri = r. Induction
(over the role depth) yields that E is ∀-safe for Pi, and thus for its subset {D̂}.
Hence, (2b.) of Proposition 2 is satisfied. 
However, SSG(C,P) may also contain ∀-safe generalizations C′ of C for P
that are not optimal, as demonstrated by the following example.
Example 1. Let C = ∃r1.(A  B)  ∃r2.B  ∃r3.A and P = {D1,D2}, where
D1 = ∃r1.A  ∃r2. and D2 = ∃r1.B  ∃r3..
We have C  D1 and C  D2, and thus C is not even compliant, let alone ∀-safe,
for P. Applying the construction of Definition 3 to C and P, we first construct
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the minimal hitting set H1 = {∃r1.A,∃r1.B} of con∃(D1) and con∃(D2). Since
rd(A) = 0 = rd(B) we remove the atom ∃r1.(A  B) from con(C), which yields
the concept C ′1 = ∃r2.B  ∃r3.A ∈ SSG(C,P).
If we take the minimal hitting set H2 = {∃r1.A,∃r3.} instead, then we
need to remove the atoms ∃r1.(A  B) and ∃r3.A from con(C), which yields
C ′2 = ∃r2.B ∈ SSG(C,P). Since C ′1  C ′2, the concept C ′2 cannot be optimal.
The next lemma states that every ∀-safe generalization of C subsumes some
element of SSG(C,P).
Lemma 3. For all ∀-safe generalization C ′′ of C for P, there is C ′ ∈ SSG(C,P)
such that C ′  C ′′.
Proof. If C is ∀-safe for P, then obviously C ∈ SSG(C,P) and we have C  C ′′.
Thus, let us assume that C is not ∀-safe for P. Since C ′′ is a ∀-safe generalization
of C for P, we have C  C ′′ and C ′′ satisfies the properties (1.) and (2.) in
Proposition 2. Due to (1.), con(C ′′) contains no concept name A such that
A ∈ con(D) for some D ∈ P with rd(D) = 0. In addition, for all Djν ∈ P
such that rd(Djν ) > 0, there is ∃r.Gjν ∈ con(Djν ) such that (2a.) or (2b.) of
Proposition 2 holds. The set H ′ := {Gj1 , . . . , Gjp} is a hitting set of the sets
con∃(Dj1), . . . , con
∃(Djp) considered in Definition 3. Thus, there is a minimal
hitting set H of con∃(Di1), . . . , con∃(Diq ) such that H ⊆ H′. Let C ′ be the
element of SSG(C,P) that is constructed by using H. We show that C ′  C ′′
using Proposition 1.
First, consider a concept name A ∈ con(C ′′). Since C  C ′′, we know that
A ∈ con(C). In addition, as mentioned above, con(C ′′) contains no concept
name A such that A ∈ con(D) for some D ∈ P with rd(D) = 0. Consequently,
when constructing C ′ from C, the concept name A is not removed, which yields
A ∈ con(C ′).
Second, consider an existential restriction ∃r.E ∈ con(C ′′). Since C  C ′′,
there is ∃r.Ci ∈ con(C) such that Ci  E. If ∃r.Ci is not removed or general-
ized when constructing C ′, then ∃r.Ci ∈ con(C ′), and we are done. If ∃r.Ci is
removed from con(C) to construct C ′, then there is ∃r.D′ ∈ H ⊆ H′ such that
rd(D′) = 0. By the definition of H′, we thus know that ∃r.D′ must satisfy (2a.)
of Proposition 2. But then ∃r.E ∈ con(C ′′) would not be possible.
Finally, if ∃r.Ci is generalized in the construction of C ′ from C by replacing
it with

F∈SSG(Ci,Pi) ∃r.F , then we know that Pi is non-empty. Now, consider
an element D′ of Pi. Then, ∃r.D′ ∈ H ⊆ H′ and rd(D′) > 0 imply that ∃r.D′
satisfies (2b.) of Proposition 2. Since ∃r.E ∈ con(C ′′), we thus know that E is
∀-safe for {D′}. Since this is true for all elements D′ of Pi, Lemma 1 yields that E
is ∀-safe for Pi. Together with Ci  E, this shows that E is a ∀-safe generalization
of Ci for Pi, and thus induction yields that there is F ∈ SSG(Ci,Pi) such that
F  E. Since ∃r.F ∈ con(C ′), this concludes our proof that C ′  C ′′. 
The following proposition states that all optimal ∀-safe generalizations of C
for P are contained in SSG(C,P).
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Proposition 3. Let C be an EL  concept and P = {D1, . . . , Dp} a redundancy-
free EL  policy. If C ′′ is an optimal ∀-safe generalization of C for P, then C ′′ ∈ 
SSG(C, P) (up to equivalence).
Proof. Given an optimal ∀-safe generalization C ′′ of C for P, Lemma 3 yields 
an element C ′ ∈ SSG(C, P) such that C ′  C ′′. By Lemma 2, C  C ′ and C ′ is 
∀-safe for P. Thus, optimality of C ′′ implies that C ′ ≡ C ′′. 
The following theorem is an easy consequence of this proposition and the 
definition of SSG(C, P).
Theorem 2. Let C be an EL  concept and P = {D1, . . . , Dp} a redundancy-free 
EL  policy. The cardinality of the set of all optimal ∀-safe generalization of C 
for P is at most exponential, and each of its elements has at most exponential 
size. Additionally, the set of all optimal ∀-safe generalizations of C for P can be 
computed in exponential time.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that the set SSG(C, P) satisfies the properties 
stated above. The cardinality of SSG(C, P) is at most exponential since in Def-
inition 3 at most exponentially many minimal hitting sets are considered, and 
each such set yields exactly one element of SSG(C, P). Moreover, the size of each 
element C ′ in SSG(C, P) may become exponential (but not more) since, during 
constructing C ′, we may need to compute a conjunction of at most exponentially 
many existential restrictions, where each of them has at most exponential size 
(by induction). To compute the set of all optimal ∀-safe generalizations of C 
for P, we need to remove all concepts in SSG(C, P) that are not minimal w.r.t. 
subsumption. This requires exponentially many (polynomial) subsumption tests 
on exponentially large concepts. 
The following example shows that an algorithm for computing all optimal 
∀-safe generalizations cannot be better than exponential in the worst case.
Example 2. Let C = ∃r1.(∃s1.  ∃s2.)  . . .   ∃rn.(∃s1.  ∃s2.) and P = 
{∃ri.∃s1.∃ri.∃s2. | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Using Definition 3, we obtain that SSG(C, P) 
consists of the exponentially many concepts ∃r1.∃sj1 . . . .∃rn.∃sjn ., where 
ji ∈ {1, 2} for all i = 1, . . . , n. Since these concepts are incomparable w.r.t. 
subsumption, they are exactly the optimal ∀-safe generalization of C for P.
The ∀-Optimality Problem. Given EL  concepts C, C ′ such that C  C ′ and 
an EL  policy P, the  ∀-optimality problem asks whether C ′ is an optimal ∀-safe 
generalization of C for P. Since  ∀-safety is a polynomial, upward-closed property 
(see Definition 5 in [5]), Theorem 3 in [5] yields the following complexity upper-
bound for this problem.
Proposition 4. The ∀-optimality problem is in coNP.
Similarly to the case of the ∃-optimality problem in [5], we do not know 
whether the ∀-optimality problem is also coNP-hard. But we can show that it
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is at least as hard as the Hypergraph Duality Problem [8], called Dual. Note
that this problem is in coNP, but conjectured to be neither in P nor coNP-hard
[9,10].
Proposition 5. Dual can be reduced in polynomial time to the ∀-optimality
problem.
The proof of this proposition, which is similar to the one of Proposition 7 in [5],
is omitted due to the space constraints.
4 Investigating ∀∃-Safety
We now consider the case where the attacker’s knowledge is assumed to be given
by an FLE concept. Since FL0 is a sublogic of FLE , concepts that are ∀∃-
safe are also ∀-safe, but the opposite need not hold. The following proposition
characterizes ∀∃-safety.
Proposition 6. Let C be an EL concept and P = {D1, . . . , Dp} a redundancy-
free EL policy. Then C is ∀∃-safe for P iff
(1.) A ∈ con(C) for all concept names A ∈ con(D1) ∪ . . . ∪ con(Dp), and
(2.) for all existential restrictions ∃r.D′ ∈ con(D1) ∪ . . . ∪ con(Dp), there is no
concept of the form ∃r.E in con(C).
Proof. First, assume that C is not ∀∃-safe for P. Hence, there is Di ∈ P and
an FLE concept C ′′ such that C ′′ complies with P, but C  C ′′  Di. This
subsumption implies that A ∈ con(C) ∪ con(C ′′) holds for all A ∈ con(Di). If
there is an A ∈ con(Di) such that A ∈ con(C), then property (1.) is violated.
Otherwise, all A ∈ con(Di) belong to con(C ′′). But then C ′′  Di can only
be due to the fact that there is ∃r.D′ ∈ con(Di) such that, for all ∃r.C ′ ∈
con(C ′′), we have C ′

filler∀r (C
′′)  D′. Applying Proposition 1 again to the
subsumption C  C ′′  Di thus yields that that there is ∃r.E ∈ con(C) such
that E

filler∀r (C ′′)  D′. Consequently, property (2.) is violated.
To show the other direction, assume that condition (1.) or (2.) is violated.
If (1.) is violated, then there are Di ∈ P and a concept name A such that
A ∈ con(C) ∩ con(Di). We modify Di to C ′′ by removing A from the top-level
conjunction of Di. Then C ′′ is an EL concept, and thus also an FLE concept,
such that C ′′  Di and C  C ′′ ≡ C  Di  Di. Given D ∈ P \ {Di} we have
C ′′  D since otherwise Di  C ′′  D would contradict our assumption that P
is redundancy-free. Thus C is not ∀∃-safe for P.
If condition (2.) is violated, then there are Di ∈ P and existential restrictions
∃r.D′ ∈ con(Di) and ∃r.E ∈ con(C). Let C ′′ be obtained from Di by replacing
every existential restriction ∃r.F from the top-level conjunction of Di with the
corresponding value restriction ∀r.F . To show that C  C ′′  Di, it is sufficient
to show that C  C ′′  ∃r.F for all ∃r.F ∈ con(Di). This is the case since
C  C ′′  ∃r.E  ∀r.F  ∃r.(E  F )  ∃r.F .
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It remains to show that C ′′ is compliant with P, i.e., for all D ∈ P we have
C ′′  D. If D contains an existential restriction for r, then this holds since C ′′
does not contain an existential restriction for r. In particular, this covers the
case where D = Di. If D does not contain an existential restriction for r, then
the changes we made when going from Di to C ′′ are not relevant for D, i.e., we
have C ′′  D iff Di  D. Since P is redundancy-free, this yields C ′′  D. 
Due to the simplicity of the conditions (1.) and (2.) in this proposition, it
is now easy to show that all relevant computation or decision problems for ∀∃-
safety are tractable.
Theorem 3. Given EL concepts C,C ′′ and a redundancy-free EL policy P, we
– can decide whether C is ∀∃-safe for P,
– can compute the unique optimal ∀∃-safe generalization of C for P, and
– can decide whether C ′′ is an optimal ∀∃-safe generalization of C for P
in polynomial time.
Proof. First, note that the characterization of ∀∃-safety given in Proposition 6
can obviously be checked in polynomial time. Secondly, to obtain the optimal
∀∃-safe generalization of C for P, we simply remove from con(C) all concept
names A with A ∈ con(D1)∪ . . . ∪ con(Dp), and all existential restrictions ∃r.E
such that con(D1)∪ . . . ∪ con(Dp) contains an existential restriction for the role
r. This can clearly be done in polynomial time. Finally, to decide whether C ′′ is
an optimal ∀∃-safe generalization of C for P, apply the procedure just described
to C, and check whether the resulting concept C ′ is equivalent to C ′′. Since the
subsumption problem is polynomial in EL, this yields a polynomial-time decision
procedure for the optimality problem. 
5 Conclusion
We have investigated the notion of safety for a policy in the setting where the
knowledge about individuals and the policy are given by EL concepts, but the
attacker’s knowledge is assumed to be expressed in FL0 or FLE . For both cases,
we have characterized safety and have shown how to compute optimal safe gener-
alizations of a given EL concept w.r.t. a given EL policy. For FL0, the complex-
ity results proved here are the same as the ones shown in [5] for the case where
the attacker’s knowledge is assumed to be expressed in EL. Nevertheless, the
characterizations of safety and the developed algorithms are, of course, different
depending on whether FL0 or EL is considered. For the case of FLE , the char-
acterization of safety developed in this paper is considerably simpler, and as a
consequence the relevant decision and computation problems become tractable.
While this may be seen as an advantage, it is actually due to the fact that, with
an assumed stronger capability of the attacker, concepts need to be changed
more radically to make them safe. Thus, less knowledge can be preserved when
publishing information in a privacy-preserving way.
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In the future, we intend to continue this work in several directions. First, we
want to extend our framework to a setting where the knowledge about individu-
als is given by an ABox that contains not only concept assertions, but also role
assertions. As mentioned in the introduction, our idea for achieving this is to
combine our approaches with the ones developed in [11,12]. In a second step, we
intend to add a TBox that constrains the interpretation of concepts. This means
that subsumption w.r.t. all interpretations is replaced by subsumption w.r.t. all
models of the TBox. Since this subsumption relation is less easy to character-
ize than the characterization given in Proposition 1 for subsumption without a
TBox, this will probably be a quite challenging task. As a starting point, we will
also look at the case where the TBox satisfies certain cycle-restrictions (see, e.g.,
[1]). In addition, we intend to look also at other (combinations of) DLs in these
settings.
Another interesting question is how to impose additional constraints on which
knowledge is potentially available to an attacker. At the moment, we play it very
safe by assuming that any knowledge expressible in the respective DL could be
available to the attacker. This may, however, result in very general and unin-
formative safe generalizations, as in our example in the introduction when we
assume the attacker’s knowledge is expressed in FLE . It might make sense to
restrict the potential knowledge of the attacker about an individual to knowl-
edge that really holds for this individuals (since we are not interested in what
follows from lies about the individual), but the question is how to express this
restriction formally. One possibility could be to assume that the “real world” is
given by a finite interpretation, or by a knowledge base that approximates it.
A different approach for restricting the access to information contained in an
ontology has been investigated in [4]. In this work, the axioms of the ontology
are labeled with access restrictions, and users can only see (the consequences of)
the axioms for which they have the right of access. In contrast, in our work the
access restrictions are formulated on the side of the consequences (in the form
of policies) rather than on the side of the axioms. In addition, in [4] axioms are
removed completely if a user does not have the right to access them, whereas
in [5] and in the present work they are weakened appropriately. Nevertheless, it
might be interesting to combine the two approaches, e.g., by producing variants
of an axiom of different strength, and allowing a user that does not have the
right to access the original axiom at least access to an appropriate weakening,
which depends on the user’s access right.
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